Designing electricity auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fabra, Natalia; von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik; Harbord, David
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Oslo
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00002.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 23-46
• 关键词: uniform; POWER

摘要

Motivated by the new auction format in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids, and the elasticity of demand are analyzed. We also consider the relationship between market structure and market performance in the two auction formats.