Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Chakraborty, Archishman; Gupta, Nandini; Harbaugh, Rick
• 署名单位: City University of New York (CUNY) System; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00011.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 176-194
• 关键词: bidders; wine; ART

摘要

Should a seller with private information sell the best or worst goods first? Considering the sequential auction of two stochastically equivalent goods, we find that the seller has an incentive to impress buyers by selling the better good first because the seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in the values of the goods across periods. When this impression effect is strong enough, selling the better good first is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium. By credibly revealing to all buyers the seller's ranking of the goods, an equilibrium strategy of sequencing the goods reduces buyer information rents and increases expected revenues in accordance with the linkage principle.