Asymmetric information in insurance:: general testable implications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Jullien, Bruno; Salanie, Bernard; Salanie, Francois
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00057.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 783-798
• 关键词: Adverse selection; imperfect information; moral hazard; MARKET; equilibrium; uncertainty; RISK

摘要

Several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance have tested for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk, as predicted by standard models of pure adverse selection or pure moral hazard. We show here that the positive correlation property can be extended to general setups: competitive insurance markets and cases where risk aversion is public. We test our results on a French dataset. Our tests confirm that the estimated correlation is positive; they also suggest the presence of market power.