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作者：Gavazza, Alessandro
作者单位：New York University
摘要：When consumers concentrate their purchases at a single firm, firms that offer more products than their rivals gain market share for all their products. These spillovers induce firms to offer a greater variety of products rather than lower prices, and a concentrated industry with few large firms can arise if spillovers are strong enough. This article presents a simple model that illustrates this mechanism explicitly. The empirical analysis documents strong demand spillovers in the retail segmen...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Muehlheusser, Gerd
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Hamburg
摘要：We study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone andunder some additional restrictionshump-shaped and U-shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and ...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Florence
摘要：Electronic academic journal websites provide text and data mining (and linking) services. Fully realizing the benefit of these services requires interconnection among websites. We perform a comparison between multilateral interconnection through an open platform and bilateral interconnection, and find that publishers are fully interconnected in the former regime whereas they are often partially interconnected in the latter regime for exclusion or differentiation motives. If partial interconnec...
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作者：Ding, Wei; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
作者单位：University of Bonn; Korea University
摘要：The literature on research and development contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present article analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit himself to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest. We compare fixed-prize tournaments with and without entry fees, and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement. Our main result...
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作者：Bourjade, Sylvain; Jullien, Bruno
作者单位：Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); Universite de Toulouse; TBS Education; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preferences for the status quo. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias does not always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert's incentives to report truthfully when the market can identify the con...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We model the dynamic process wherein two privately informed plaintiffs may file and combine related lawsuits in order to lower trial costs and/or improve the likelihood of winning. The equilibrium resembles a bandwagon: some plaintiff types file early, whereas others wait and only file suit if they observe a previous filing. Finally, some plaintiff types never file and some early filers drop their suits if not joined by another plaintiff. We then consider the effect of allowing preemptive sett...
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作者：Mukherjee, Arijit; Vasconcelos, Luis
作者单位：Michigan State University; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follow...
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作者：Khanna, Naveen; Mathews, Richmond D.
作者单位：Michigan State University; Duke University
摘要：Existing models show that herding in decisions can cause significant information loss, inferior information aggregation, and impaired decision making. However, we show that in a multistage decision setting with endogenous information production, herding on the initial decision can actually result in superior aggregate information and improved decisions. This is because the possibility of herding by a follower incentivizes the leader to increase its ex ante information production to an extent t...
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作者：Ciapanna, Emanuela
摘要：This article analyzes the practice of opportunistic poaching of consultants by clients, with particular reference to the business consulting industry. The strategic interaction of consulting groups, client firms, and consultants gives rise to a market equilibrium in a mixed economy. Under very general conditions, whenever a match client-consultant is formed, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where the consulting group pleases the client's request and the consultant is poached by the client. T...
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作者：Tang, Xun
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders' values and private signals. This poses a challenge when bids are observed from first-price, common-value auctions. I bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure. Using data from U.S. municipal bond auctions, I find first-price and second-price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in r...
