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作者：Goltsman, Maria
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship-specific investment and renegotiation. In such a setting, a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model, namely that of transmitting information between the parties. The article shows that a partial-disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract. If the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is as...
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作者：Auray, Stephane; Mariotti, Thomas; Moizeau, Fabien
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Rennes; University of Sherbrooke
摘要：We develop a dynamic regulation model of quality provision where maintenance efforts and quality shocks have a durable impact. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetric information can lead to overprovision of quality, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction effect. When the regulator contracts with a single agent, the efficiency of their relationship depends on the regulator's ability to transfer rents across periods. Hiring a single agent with unlimited liability is soc...
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作者：Gilpatric, Scott M.; Vossler, Christian A.; McKee, Michael
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University
摘要：This article adds to the regulatory compliance literature through the theoretical development and experimental testing of two endogenous audit mechanisms that use contemporaneous relative comparisons, based on disclosed information or imperfect signals of compliance effort, to generate a compliance competition among agents. This type of audit mechanism has some advantages over the more widely studied dynamic audit mechanisms that condition an agent's audit probability on past compliance, and p...
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作者：Hagiu, Andrei; Jullien, Bruno
作者单位：Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We analyze the incentives to divert search for an information intermediary who enables buyers (consumers) to search affiliated sellers (stores). We identify two original motives for diverting search (i.e., inducing consumers to search more than they would like): (i) trading off higher total consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) influencing stores' choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). We characterize the conditions under which there would be no role for se...
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作者：Arya, Anil; Mittendorf, Brian
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：In this article, we investigate the welfare consequences of disclosure of vertical contracts. When much of retail competition is among products provided by a dominant supplier, disclosure provides a means through which the supplier can use its prices to coordinate the retail behavior of its wholesale customers. From the retail consumers' perspective, such coordination is unwanted, leading them to favor opacity of contracts. When retail competition is across brands made by different suppliers, ...
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作者：Schiraldi, Pasquale
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This article specifies and estimates a structural dynamic model of consumer demand for new and used durable goods. Its primary contribution is to provide an explicit estimation procedure for transaction costs. Identification of transaction costs is achieved from the variation in the share of consumers choosing to hold a given car type each period, and from the share of consumers choosing to purchase the same car type that period. Specifically, I estimate a random-coefficient discrete-choice mo...
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作者：Copeland, Adam; Dunn, Wendy; Hall, George
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Brandeis University
摘要：This article studies the within-model-year pricing, production, and inventory management of new automobiles. Using new monthly data on U.S. transaction prices, we document that, for the typical vehicle, prices fall over the model year at a 9.0% annual rate. Concurrently, both sales and inventories are hump shaped. To explain these time series, we formulate an industry model for new automobiles in which inventory and pricing decisions are made simultaneously. The model predicts that automakers'...
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作者：Anand, Bharat N.; Shachar, Ron
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We empirically study the informational role of advertising in matching consumers with products when consumers are uncertain about both observable and unobserved program attributes. Our focus is on the network television industry, in which the products are television shows. We estimate a model that allows us to distinguish between the direct effect of advertising on utility and its effect through the information set. A notable behavioral implication is that exposure to informational advertising...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten; Pichler, Paul; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of Vienna; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of Essex
摘要：This article analyzes a sequential search model where firms face identical but stochastic production costs, the realizations of which are unknown to consumers. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying a reservation price property and provide a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. We show that (i) firms set on average higher prices and make larger profits compared to the scenario where consumers observe production costs, (ii) expected prices and consumer welfa...
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作者：Spector, David
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：A firm may induce some customers to sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size, exclude it from the market, and enjoy increased market power. This strategy may result in socially inefficient exclusion even if the excluded firm is present at the contracting stage and can make counteroffers. In addition, allowing for breach penalty clauses decreases firms incentives to exclude rivals, because such clauses allow a firm to use customers as a conduit for the tra...
