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作者：Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J. Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua
作者单位：Peking University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or two-stage auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two-stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are taken, deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show tha...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Sourav; Mukherjee, Arijit
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Michigan State University
摘要：We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identified by two parameters: (i) quality or his likelihood of observing the state (i.e., learning what the best decision is) and (ii) agenda or the preferred decision that is independent of the state. An informed expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We offer a general characterization of the equilibrium. From the decision-maker's standpoint, (a) higher quality is not necessarily better, (b)...
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作者：Dunne, Timothy; Klimek, Shawn D.; Roberts, Mark J.; Xu, Daniel Yi
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Duke University
摘要：This article estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit for two US service industries: dentists and chiropractors. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are important determinants of long-run firm values, firm turnover, and market structure. In the dentist industry entry costs were subsidized in geographic markets designated as Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) and the estimated m...
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作者：Fukuda, Emiko; Kamijo, Yoshio; Takeuchi, Ai; Masui, Michiharu; Funaki, Yukihiko
作者单位：National Defense Academy - Japan; Kochi University Technology; Ritsumeikan University; Waseda University
摘要：Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values. In the theoretical investigation, by applying the locally envy-free Nash equilibrium to the VCG, we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the a...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Using an earnings management model in which managers manipulate information when the firm's control system fails, I introduce a measure of earnings quality, based on the notion of integral precision, that has solid theoretical foundations. A trade-off between the frequency and the magnitude of overstatements is shown: overstatements are larger when misreporting is less likely. Overall, the model generates a distribution of earnings announcements similar to its empirical analogue and provides a...
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作者：Yang, Huanxing
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We develop a search model to explain the long tail effect. Search targetability, or the quality of search, is explicitly modelled. Consumers are searching for the right products within the right categories. As search costs decrease, or search targetability increases, additional variety of goods catering to long tail consumers will be provided, and the concentration of sales across different categories of goods decreases. The effects of a decrease in search costs or an increase in search target...
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作者：Rey, Patrick; Whinston, Michael D.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of , who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit-maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to thi...
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作者：Hong, Han; Paarsch, Harry J.; Xu, Pai
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Melbourne; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the common-value paradigm, we analyze the behavior of the transaction price as the numbers of bidders and units gets large in a particular way. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges in probability to the true, but ex ante unknown, value. Subsequently, we demonstrate that the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price is Gaussian. Fi...
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作者：Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarree, Jacques
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Sogang University
摘要：We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low-powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low-powe...
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作者：Roberts, James W.
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article shows how reserve prices can be used to control for unobserved object heterogeneity to identify and estimate the distribution of bidder values in auctions. Reserve prices are assumed to be monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity, but not necessarily set optimally. The model is estimated using transaction prices from a used car auction platform to show that the platform enables sellers to capture a large fraction of the potential value from selling their vehicle. I...
