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作者：Hermalin, Benjamin E.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A seller can make investments that affect a tradable asset's future returns. The potential buyer of the asset cannot observe the seller's investment prior to trade, nor does he receive any signal of it, nor can he verify it in any way after trade. Despite this severe moral-hazard problem, this article shows the seller will invest with positive probability in equilibrium and that trade will occur with positive probability. The outcome of the game is sensitive to the distribution of bargaining p...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Over the last eight centuries, lawyers in common law countries have generally been precluded from buying their clients' cases. Recently, a number of economists and lawyers have argued that sale should be allowed so as to eliminate moral hazard, particularly when contingent fees are used; this argument is based on full-information reasoning. However, if the lawyer has private information about the case value, then compensation demands potentially signal this value when the client can search ove...
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作者：Krishna, R. Vijay; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Taylor, Curtis R.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Duke University
摘要：We study a setting in which a principal contracts with an agent to operate a firm over an infinite time horizon when the agent is liquidity constrained and privately observes the sequence of cost realizations. We formulate the principal's problem as a dynamic program in which the state variable is the agent's continuation utility, which is naturally interpreted as his equity in the firm. The optimal incentive scheme resembles what is commonly regarded as a sweat equity contract, with all rents...
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作者：Hummel, Patrick; Morgan, John; Stocken, Phillip C.
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Dartmouth College
摘要：A firm surveys a large number of consumers, some of whom sincerely report their tastes and others of whom report strategically. It makes product decisions using the sample mean of survey responses. When firms and consumers agree on the fraction of sincere consumers, information loss is severe, and many products are flops as they poorly match consumer tastes. When beliefs differ, however, equilibrium is in linear strategies, and information aggregates. Despite this, flops still arise. A firm, h...
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作者：Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L.; Petrikaite, Vaiva
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Groningen; Tinbergen Institute; University of Navarra
摘要：We study the incentives to merge and the aggregate implications of mergers in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated products and consumers search sequentially for satisfactory deals. When search frictions are substantial, firms have an incentive to merge and to retail their products within a single store, which induces consumers to begin their search there. Such a merger lowers the profits of the outsiders and may benefit consumers due to more efficient search. Overall w...
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作者：Lee, Jinhyung; McCullough, Jeffrey S.; Town, Robert J.
作者单位：Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Health information technology (IT) has been championed as a tool that can transform health care delivery. We estimate the parameters of a value-added hospital production function correcting for endogenous input choices to assess the private returns hospitals earn from health IT. Despite high marginal products, the total benefits from expanded IT adoption are modest. Over the span of our data, health IT inputs increased by more than 210% and contributed about 6% to the increase in value-added. ...
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作者：Ellickson, Paul B.; Houghton, Stephanie; Timmins, Christopher
作者单位：University of Rochester; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We measure the effects of chain economies, business stealing, and heterogeneous firms' comparative advantages in the discount retail industry. Traditional entry models are ill suited for this high-dimensional problem of strategic interaction. Building upon recently developed profit inequality techniques, our model admits any number of potential rivals and stores per location, an endogenous distribution network, and unobserved (to the econometrician) location attributes that may cause firms to ...
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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate private contractors. The two provision modes differ in their incentives to innovate and to gather private information about future costs to adapt the service provision to changing circumstances. The go...
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作者：Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Paer; Philpott, Andrew B.
作者单位：University of Sydney; University of Auckland
摘要：We introduce the concept of an offer distribution function to analyze randomized offer curves in multiunit procurement auctions. We characterize mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for pay-as-bid auctions where demand is uncertain and costs are common knowledge, a setting for which pure-strategy supply function equilibria typically do not exist. We generalize previous results on mixtures over horizontal offers as in Bertrand-Edgeworth games and also characterize novel mixtures over partly increasin...
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作者：Hoerner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We examine a repeated interaction between an agent who undertakes experiments and a principal who provides the requisite funding. A dynamic agency cost arises-the more lucrative the agent's stream of rents following a failure, the more costly are current incentives, giving the principal a motivation to reduce the project's continuation value. We characterize the set of recursive Markov equilibria. Efficient equilibria front-load the agent's effort, inducing maximum experimentation over an init...
