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作者：Montez, Joao
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：This article offers a new explanation for unscheduled price cuts and slow adoption of durable goods. We study a standard durable-good monopoly model with a finite number of buyers and show that this game can have multiple subgame perfect equilibria in addition to the Pacman outcomeincluding the Coase conjecture. Of particular interest is a class of equilibria where the seller first charges a high price and only lowers that price once somebut not allhigh-valuation buyers purchase. This price st...
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作者：Lampe, Ryan; Moser, Petra
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Patent pools, which combine complementary patents of competing firms, are expected to increase overall welfare but potentially discourage innovation in substitutes for the pool technology. This article exploits a new historical data set on changes in patenting and firm entry for a clearly defined pool technology and substitutes in the 19th-century sewing machine industry. This analysis reveals a substantial increase in innovation for an-albeit technologically inferior-substitute technology. Hi...
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作者：Einav, Liran; Jenkins, Mark; Levin, Jonathan
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study the adoption of automated credit scoring at a large auto finance company and the changes it enabled in lending practices. Credit scoring appears to have increased profits by roughly a thousand dollars per loan. We identify two distinct benefits of risk classification: the ability to screen high-risk borrowers and the ability to target more generous loans to lower-risk borrowers. We show that these had effects of similar magnitude. We also document that credit scoring compressed profit...
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作者：Schuett, Florian
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：Patent examination is a problem of moral hazard followed by adverse selection: examiners must have incentives to exert effort, but also to truthfully reveal the evidence they find. I develop a theoretical model to study the design of incentives for examiners. The model can explain the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the U.S. patent office, where examiners are essentially rewarded for granting patents, as well as the variation in compensation schemes and patent quality across patent offi...
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作者：Farhi, Emmanuel; Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Product quality certifiers may not reveal the identity of unsuccessful applicants/sellers for three reasons. First, they respond to the desire of individual sellers to avoid the stigma from rejection. Second, nontransparency helps a certifier to increase his market power by raising the stigma from lower-tier certification. Third, transparency does not help screen among heterogeneous sellers. Strategic complementarities arise as sellers move down the certification pecking order and lead to the ...
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作者：Galasso, Alberto; Schankerman, Mark; Serrano, Carlos J.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study how the market for innovation affects enforcement of patent rights. We show that patent transactions arising from comparative advantages in commercialization increase litigation, but trades driven by advantages in patent enforcement reduce it. Using data on trade and litigation of individually owned patents in the United States, we exploit variation in capital gains tax rates across states as an instrument to identify the causal effect of trade on litigation. We find that taxes strong...
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作者：Pozzi, Andrea
摘要：I examine the introduction of an online shopping service by a large supermarket chain also operating a network of brick-and-mortar stores. The establishment of the Internet channel led to a 13 percent increase in overall revenues, with limited cannibalization of traditional sales. I study the mechanisms underlying this result, focusing on two areas. First, I demonstrate the importance of the reduction of customers' travel costs in the attraction of new business. Second, I provide some evidence...
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作者：Johnson, Justin P.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I examine how the increasing ability of firms to target their ads influences market outcomes when consumers have access to advertising-avoidance tools. Although firms generally benefit from improved targeting, consumers need not. I also show that there may be too little blocking of ads in equilibrium and consider the role of targeted advertising when niche firms compete against mass-market firms.
