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作者：Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques; Scott, Troy J.
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Research Triangle Institute
摘要：When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent's wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resourcesthe so-called burning of money. A more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible when the private information arrives in time to rescale the agent's effort. Rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because...
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作者：Cisternas, Gonzalo; Figueroa, Nicolas
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：We characterize the optimal mechanism and investment level in an environment where (i) two projects of independent costs are purchased sequentially, (ii) the buyer can commit to a two-period mechanism, and (iii) the winner of the first project can invest in a cost-reducing technology between auctions. We show that, in an attempt to induce more competition in the first period, the optimal mechanism gives an advantage to the first-period winner in the second auction. As a result of this advantag...
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作者：Benkard, C. Lanier; Jeziorski, Przemyslaw; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Columbia University
摘要：This article explores the application of oblivious equilibrium (OE) to highly concentrated markets. We define a natural extended notion of OE, called partially oblivious equilibrium (POE), that allows for there to be a set of strategically important firms (the dominant firms), whose firm states are always monitored by every other firm in the market. We perform computational experiments that explore the characteristics of POE, OE, and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and find that POE generall...
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作者：Dubois, Pierre; de Mouzon, Olivier; Scott-Morton, Fiona; Seabright, Paul
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Yale University
摘要：This article quantifies the relationship between market size and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry using improved, and newer, methods and data. We find significant elasticities of innovation to expected market size with a point estimate under our preferred specification of 0.23. This suggests that, on average, $2.5 billion is required in additional revenue to support the invention of one new chemical entity. This magnitude is plausible given recent accounting estimates of the cost of i...
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作者：Schwenen, Sebastian
作者单位：Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Technical University of Munich
摘要：This article employs a simple model to describe bidding behavior in multi-unit uniform price procurement auctions when firms are capacity constrained. Using data from the New York City procurement auctions for power generating capacity, I find that firms use simple bidding strategies to coordinate on an equilibrium that extracts high rents for all bidders. I show theoretically and empirically that the largest bidder submits the auction clearing bid. All other bidders submit inframarginal bids ...
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作者：Bagnoli, Mark; Watts, Susan G.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：Competitive intelligence (CI) activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information. We show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less (more) likely with Cournot (Bertrand) competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies. When CI costs are independent of information characteristics, each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a Bertrand compet...
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作者：Ayres, Ian; Banaji, Mahzarin; Jolls, Christine
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We investigate the impact of seller race in a field experiment involving baseball card auctions on eBay. Photographs showed the cards held by either a dark-skinned/African-American hand or a light-skinned/Caucasian hand. Cards held by African-American sellers sold for approximately 20% ($0.90) less than cards held by Caucasian sellers. Our evidence of race differentials is important because the online environment is well controlled (with the absence of confounding tester effects) and because t...
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作者：Au, Pak Hung
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We study dynamic information disclosure by a sender attempting to persuade a partially informed receiver to take an action. We consider vertical and horizontal information. With vertical information, an optimal disclosure plan is static. If the sender cannot commit to the disclosure plan, there exists a simple Markov equilibrium with sequential disclosure. Shrinking the time interval to zero gives rise to full disclosure almost instantly. With horizontal information, the sender often benefits ...
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作者：Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried
作者单位：Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of St Gallen; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We analyze the general equilibrium of an economy in which a competitive industry produces nonexclusive insurance services. The equilibrium is inefficient because insurance contracts cannot control moral hazard, and welfare can be improved by policies that reduce insurance by increasing its price above marginal cost. We discuss how insurance production costs that exceed expected claim payments interact with moral hazard in determining the equilibrium's inefficiency, and show that these costs ca...
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作者：Fan, Ying; Xiao, Mo
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Arizona
摘要：The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the monopolistic US local telephone industry to new entrants. However, substantial entry costs have prevented some markets from becoming competitive. We study various subsidy policies designed to encourage entry. We estimate a dynamic entry game using data on potential and actual entrants, allowing for heterogeneous option values of waiting. We find that subsidies to smaller markets are more cost effective in reducing monopoly markets, but subsidies to on...
