Dynamic information disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Au, Pak Hung
• 署名单位: Nanyang Technological University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12111
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 791-823
• 关键词: price-discrimination; transmission; monopoly

摘要

We study dynamic information disclosure by a sender attempting to persuade a partially informed receiver to take an action. We consider vertical and horizontal information. With vertical information, an optimal disclosure plan is static. If the sender cannot commit to the disclosure plan, there exists a simple Markov equilibrium with sequential disclosure. Shrinking the time interval to zero gives rise to full disclosure almost instantly. With horizontal information, the sender often benefits from sequential disclosure. Assuming partial commitment and a special receiver-type space, a Markov equilibrium exists and almost instant full disclosure arises in the limit.