Competitive intelligence and disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bagnoli, Mark; Watts, Susan G.
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12103
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 709-729
• 关键词: information exchange; supply chain; oligopoly; duopoly; cournot; bertrand; MARKETS; equilibria; welfare; price

摘要

Competitive intelligence (CI) activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information. We show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less (more) likely with Cournot (Bertrand) competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies. When CI costs are independent of information characteristics, each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a Bertrand competitor with customer information. Only when the cost advantage is sufficiently great does each firm seek information useful to itself and its rival.