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作者：Li, Tong; Lu, Jingfeng; Zhao, Li
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; National University of Singapore; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：We study auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders. Our model accounts for risk averse bidders' endogenous participation decision and thus encompasses the existing entry models. We establish entry and bidding equilibrium in first-price auction and ascending auction mechanisms and show that bidders' entry behavior differs between these two mechanisms with different forms of risk aversion. Our approach provides testable implications of risk aversion in terms of entry behavior. We ana...
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作者：Bronnenberg, Bart J.
作者单位：Tilburg University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Consumers commonly face purchasing costs, for example, travel or wait time, that are fixed to quantity but increase with variety. This article investigates the impact of such costs on the demand and supply of variety. Purchasing costs limit demand for variety like prices limit demand for quantity. When demand for variety is low, manufacturers generally invest substantially in lowering purchasing costs, to attract consumers. In the monopolistic competition free-entry equilibrium, providing conv...
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作者：Chen, Daniel L.
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：The alienability of legal claims holds the promise of increasing access to justice and fostering development of law. I develop a principal-agent framework where litigation funders provide expertise in reducing uncertainty in agents' disutility of production. The model leads to the counterintuitive prediction that litigation funders prefer cases with novel issues, and social surplus is positively correlated with legal uncertainty. Consistent with the model, court backlog, court expenditures, an...
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作者：Wang, Emily Yucai
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：The typical analysis on the effectiveness of soda taxes relies on price elasticity estimates from static demand models, which ignores consumers' inventory behaviors and their persistent tastes. This article provides estimates of the relevant price elasticities based on a dynamic demand model that better addresses potential intertemporal substitution and unobservable persistent heterogeneous tastes. It finds that static analyses overestimate the long-run own-price elasticity of regular soda by ...
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作者：Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques; Scott, Troy J.
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Research Triangle Institute
摘要：When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent's wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resourcesthe so-called burning of money. A more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible when the private information arrives in time to rescale the agent's effort. Rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because...
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作者：Cisternas, Gonzalo; Figueroa, Nicolas
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：We characterize the optimal mechanism and investment level in an environment where (i) two projects of independent costs are purchased sequentially, (ii) the buyer can commit to a two-period mechanism, and (iii) the winner of the first project can invest in a cost-reducing technology between auctions. We show that, in an attempt to induce more competition in the first period, the optimal mechanism gives an advantage to the first-period winner in the second auction. As a result of this advantag...
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作者：Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Trannoy, Alain
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We characterize the set of second-best menus of student-loan contracts in an economy with risky labor-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard, and risk aversion. We combine student loans with optimal income taxation. Second-best optima provide incomplete insurance because of moral hazard. Optimal repayments must be income contingent, or the income tax must comprise a graduate tax. Individuals are ex ante unequal because of differing probabilities of success, and ex post unequal, becau...
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作者：Benkard, C. Lanier; Jeziorski, Przemyslaw; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Columbia University
摘要：This article explores the application of oblivious equilibrium (OE) to highly concentrated markets. We define a natural extended notion of OE, called partially oblivious equilibrium (POE), that allows for there to be a set of strategically important firms (the dominant firms), whose firm states are always monitored by every other firm in the market. We perform computational experiments that explore the characteristics of POE, OE, and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and find that POE generall...
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作者：Montez, Joao
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：In a make-to-stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market-wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly po...
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作者：Chone, Philippe; Linnemer, Laurent
摘要：We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price-quantity schedules in an Aghion-Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes, depending on whether and how the price charged by the dominant firm depends on the quantity purchased from the rival firm. We find that the supply of rival good is distorted downward. Moreover, given the quantity supplied from the rival, the buyer may opportunistically purchase inefficiently many units from the...
