Sequential procurement auctions and their effect on investment decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cisternas, Gonzalo; Figueroa, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12112
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 824-843
• 关键词: Contracts

摘要

We characterize the optimal mechanism and investment level in an environment where (i) two projects of independent costs are purchased sequentially, (ii) the buyer can commit to a two-period mechanism, and (iii) the winner of the first project can invest in a cost-reducing technology between auctions. We show that, in an attempt to induce more competition in the first period, the optimal mechanism gives an advantage to the first-period winner in the second auction. As a result of this advantage, the first-period winner invests more than the socially efficient level. Optimal advantages, therefore, create two different channels for cost minimization in buyer-supplier relationships.