Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benkard, C. Lanier; Jeziorski, Przemyslaw; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12102
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 671-708
• 关键词: imperfect competition; dynamic oligopoly; empirical work; games; MARKET; dimensionality; FRAMEWORK; models; radio; COSTS

摘要

This article explores the application of oblivious equilibrium (OE) to highly concentrated markets. We define a natural extended notion of OE, called partially oblivious equilibrium (POE), that allows for there to be a set of strategically important firms (the dominant firms), whose firm states are always monitored by every other firm in the market. We perform computational experiments that explore the characteristics of POE, OE, and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and find that POE generally performs well in highly concentrated markets. We also derive error bounds for evaluating the performance of POE for cases where MPE cannot be computed.