Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Trannoy, Alain
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12097
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 546-576
• 关键词: credit constraints; insurance markets; higher-education; RISK; EFFICIENCY; program

摘要

We characterize the set of second-best menus of student-loan contracts in an economy with risky labor-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard, and risk aversion. We combine student loans with optimal income taxation. Second-best optima provide incomplete insurance because of moral hazard. Optimal repayments must be income contingent, or the income tax must comprise a graduate tax. Individuals are ex ante unequal because of differing probabilities of success, and ex post unequal, because taxation trades off incentives and redistribution. In addition, second-best optima exhibit an interim equalization property: the poststudy but prework expected utilities of newly graduated student types must be equal.