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作者：Perez-Saiz, Hector
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：I estimate a model of entry for the cement industry that considers two options of expansion: building a plant or acquiring an incumbent. The model takes into account that there is a transfer of the buyer firm-level characteristics to the acquired plants, which affects profits from the acquisition. Estimates show that a less-permissive Reagan-Bush administration's merger policy would decrease the number of acquired plants by 71%, greenfield entry would increase by 9.2% and consumer surplus woul...
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作者：Fan, Ying; Xiao, Mo
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Arizona
摘要：The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the monopolistic US local telephone industry to new entrants. However, substantial entry costs have prevented some markets from becoming competitive. We study various subsidy policies designed to encourage entry. We estimate a dynamic entry game using data on potential and actual entrants, allowing for heterogeneous option values of waiting. We find that subsidies to smaller markets are more cost effective in reducing monopoly markets, but subsidies to on...
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作者：Economides, Nicholas; Hermalin, Benjamin E.
作者单位：New York University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We offer a new explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers and mobile-phone networks, offer plans with download limits: through one of two mechanisms, doing so causes content providers to reduce prices or improve quality. This generates greater surplus for consumers, which a platform captures via higher consumer access fees. Even accounting for congestion externalities, a platform limits downloads more than would be welfare maximizing; indeed, by so much, that barring suc...
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作者：Prendergast, Canice
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Empirical evidence consistently finds that incentive pay is more frequent when authority is delegated to workers than when their superiors hold authority. We provide a model where incentive pay results in the abuse of authority by their superiors, and (under reasonable conditions) implies that (i) incentive pay is higher when an agent holds control rights than when her principal has authority, (ii) effort is less responsive on the margin to incentive pay when the principal holds authority, and...
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作者：Celik, Gorkem
作者单位：ESSEC Business School
摘要：We investigate the feasibility of implementing an allocation rule with a gradual-revelation mechanism in which agents reveal their private information over time (rather than all at once). With independently distributed types, private values, and transferable utilities satisfying a single-crossing property, an ex-post monotonicity condition is sufficient for budget-balanced implementation of any incentive-compatible allocation rule with any gradual-revelation scheme. When we extend the single-c...
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作者：Kim, Jin-Hyuk; Wagman, Liad
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Illinois Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a model in which firms offer financial products to individuals, post prices for their products, and screen consumers who apply to purchase them. Any information obtained in the screening process may be traded to another firm selling related products. We show that firms' ability to sell consumer information can lead to lower prices, higher screening intensities, and increased social welfare. By exploiting variations in the adoption of local financial-privacy ordinances in five Californ...
