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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Lamy, Laurent
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：From a theory viewpoint, the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices, also called absolute auctions, or of auctions with secret reserve prices, is somewhat puzzling despite being common. By allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret, we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge. We also analyze how buyers wit...
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作者：Hong, Harrison; Kremer, Ilan; Kubik, Jeffrey D.; Mei, Jianping; Moses, Michael
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Warwick; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Syracuse University
摘要：We estimate the effect of ordering by value on revenues in sequential art auctions held by Sotheby's and Christie's. We exploit a pre determined rotation of which of these two houses holds their auction first during auction week in New York City. When the house that goes first has relatively expensive paintings compared to the other house, we find that the sale premium for the week is around 21% higher relative to the mean sale premium, and the fraction of paintings sold during the week is aro...
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作者：Reisinger, Markus; Tarantino, Emanuele
作者单位：WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; University of Mannheim
摘要：We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two-part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output-shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below-cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous ...
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作者：Huisman, Kuno J. M.; Kort, Peter M.
作者单位：Tilburg University; ASML Holding; University of Antwerp
摘要：This article considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and duopolistic framework. Each investment decision involves to determine the timing and the capacity level. The simultaneous analysis of timing and capacity decisions extends work on entry deterrence/accommodation to consider a timing/delay element. We find that, when applying an entry deterrence policy, the first investor, or incumbent, overinvests in capacity for two reasons. First, it delays the investment of the secon...
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作者：Dubois, Pierre; de Mouzon, Olivier; Scott-Morton, Fiona; Seabright, Paul
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Yale University
摘要：This article quantifies the relationship between market size and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry using improved, and newer, methods and data. We find significant elasticities of innovation to expected market size with a point estimate under our preferred specification of 0.23. This suggests that, on average, $2.5 billion is required in additional revenue to support the invention of one new chemical entity. This magnitude is plausible given recent accounting estimates of the cost of i...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University; University of Queensland
摘要：This article analyzes patent pools and their effects on litigation incentives, overall royalty rates, and social welfare when patent rights are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. With probabilistic patents, the license fees reflect the strength of the patents. We show that patent pools of complementary patents can be used to discourage infringement by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents and making them committed to a proposition of all-or-n...
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作者：Schwenen, Sebastian
作者单位：Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Technical University of Munich
摘要：This article employs a simple model to describe bidding behavior in multi-unit uniform price procurement auctions when firms are capacity constrained. Using data from the New York City procurement auctions for power generating capacity, I find that firms use simple bidding strategies to coordinate on an equilibrium that extracts high rents for all bidders. I show theoretically and empirically that the largest bidder submits the auction clearing bid. All other bidders submit inframarginal bids ...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Taub, Bart
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick; University of Glasgow
摘要：We characterize a duopoly buffeted by demand and cost shocks. Firms learn about shocks from common observation, private observation, and noisy price signals. Firms internalize how outputs affect a rival's signal, and hence output. We distinguish how the nature of information public versus privateand of what firms learn aboutcommon versus private valuesaffect equilibrium outcomes. Firm outputs weigh private information about private values by more than common values. Thus, prices contain more i...
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作者：Bagnoli, Mark; Watts, Susan G.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：Competitive intelligence (CI) activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information. We show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less (more) likely with Cournot (Bertrand) competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies. When CI costs are independent of information characteristics, each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a Bertrand compet...
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作者：Ayres, Ian; Banaji, Mahzarin; Jolls, Christine
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We investigate the impact of seller race in a field experiment involving baseball card auctions on eBay. Photographs showed the cards held by either a dark-skinned/African-American hand or a light-skinned/Caucasian hand. Cards held by African-American sellers sold for approximately 20% ($0.90) less than cards held by Caucasian sellers. Our evidence of race differentials is important because the online environment is well controlled (with the absence of confounding tester effects) and because t...
