Preemption contests between groups

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbieri, Stefano; Konrad, Kai A.; Malueg, David A.
• 署名单位: Tulane University; Max Planck Society; University of California System; University of California Riverside
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12345
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 934-961
• 关键词: best-shot; weakest-link; volunteers dilemma; group-size; COMPETITION; TRADE; POLITICS; uncertainty; INVESTMENT; INNOVATION

摘要

We consider a preemption game between competing groups; firms lobbying individually for their groups' interests provide an empirical example. Among symmetric groups, the first firm to take action bears an (unobserved) cost and wins the prize on behalf of its group. In equilibrium, the firm with the lowest cost takes action, but with delay. More competition and a smaller ratio of costs to benefits reduce delay. Firms in larger groups wait longer, but group action can occur earlier, as the probability of a low-cost firm is higher. Asymmetries in group size or strength of externalities also matter.