Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Biglaiser, Gary; Li, Fei; Murry, Charles; Zhou, Yiyi
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Boston College; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12344
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 905-933
• 关键词: Adverse selection; asymmetric information; lemons model; middlemen; search; insurance; GOODS

摘要

We present empirical evidence supporting that used cars sold by dealers have higher quality: (i) dealer transaction prices are higher than unmediated market prices, and this dealer premium increases in the age of the car as a ratio and is hump-shaped in dollar value, and (ii) used cars purchased from dealers are less likely to be resold. In a model, we show that these empirical facts can be rationalized either when dealers alleviate information asymmetry, or when dealers facilitate assortative matching. The model predictions allow us to distinguish these two theories in the data, and we find evidence for both.