Collusion with intertemporal price dispersion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Roos, Nicolas; Smirnov, Vladimir
• 署名单位: University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12309
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 158-188
• 关键词: dynamic oligopoly; MODEL; search; cycles; sales; DISCRIMINATION; COORDINATION; COMPETITION; MARKET

摘要

We develop a theory of optimal collusive intertemporal price dispersion. Dispersion clouds consumer price awareness, encouraging firms to coordinate on dispersed prices. Our theory generates a collusive rationale for price cycles and sales. Patient firms can support optimal collusion at the monopoly price. For less patient firms, monopoly prices must be punctuated with fleeting sales. The most robust structure involves price cycles that resemble Edgeworth cycles. Low consumer attentiveness enhances the effectiveness of price dispersion by reducing the payoff to deviations involving price reductions. However, for sufficiently low attentiveness, price rises are also a concern.