2期

最新文章

• Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution AI翻译
  作者：Balzer, Benjamin; Schneider, Johannes
  作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
  摘要：We study optimal methods for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), a technique to achieve settlement and avoid costly adversarial hearings. Participation is voluntary. Disputants are privately informed about their marginal cost of evidence provision. If ADR fails to engender settlement, the disputants can use the information obtained during ADR to determine what evidence to provide in an adversarial hearing. Optimal ADR induces an asymmetric information structure but makes the learning report-...
• Team incentives under private contracting AI翻译
  作者：Goldmanis, Maris; Ray, Korok
  作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
  摘要：We model a moral hazard in teams problem in which a profit-maximizing principal offers private contracts to multiple agents. Public contracts are common knowledge to all agents, but private contracts are known only by the principal and each individual agent. Public contracts can induce efficient outcomes but are subject to effort-reducing collusion between the principal and any given agent. Private contracts, by construction, are immune to such collusion but necessarily inefficient, as the pri...
• Hospital competition and quality for non-emergency patients in the English NHS AI翻译
  作者：Moscelli, Giuseppe; Gravelle, Hugh; Siciliani, Luigi
  作者单位：University of York - UK; University of Surrey; University of York - UK
  摘要：We investigate the effect on the quality of three high-volume non-emergency treatments of a reform that relaxed restrictions on patient choice of hospital. We employ a quasi difference-in-difference strategy and use control functions allowing for patient selection into providers correlated with unobserved morbidity. Public hospitals facing more rivals reduced quality, increased waiting times, and reduced length of stay for hip and knee replacements. This is likely due to regulated prices imply...
• Managing adverse selection: underinsurance versus underenrollment AI翻译
  作者：Saltzman, Evan
  作者单位：Emory University
  摘要：Adverse selection in insurance markets may lead some consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase insurance relative to the socially optimal level. I study whether common government policy interventions can mitigate both underinsurance and underenrollment due to adverse selection. I establish conditions under which there exists a tradeoff in addressing underinsurance and underenrollment. I then estimate a model of the California ACA insurance exchange using consumer-level data to ...
• Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider AI翻译
  作者：Celik, Gorkem; Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland
  作者单位：ESSEC Business School; Santa Clara University; Humboldt University of Berlin
  摘要：We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive conditions under which such manipulation determines the direction of distortions in public good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative, the public good is always underprovided, whereas overprovisi...
• Optimal financial contracting and the effects of firm's size AI翻译
  作者：Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Ropero, Eva; Villa, Alessandro T.
  作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; European University of Madrid; Duke University
  摘要：We consider the design of the optimal dynamic policy for a firm subject to moral hazard problems. With respect to the existing literature we enrich the model by introducing durable capital with partial irreversibility, which makes the size of the firm a state variable. This allows us to analyze the role of firm's size, separately from age and financial structure. We show that a higher level of capital decreases the probability of liquidation and increases the future size of the firm. Although ...
• Selling strategic information in digital competitive markets AI翻译
  作者：Bonnie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
  作者单位：IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
  摘要：This article investigates the strategies of a data broker selling information to one or to two competing firms. The data broker combines segments of the consumer demand that allow firms to third-degree price discriminate consumers. We show that the data broker (1) sells information on consumers with the highest willingness to pay; (2) keeps consumers with low willingness to pay unidentified. The data broker strategically chooses to withhold information on consumer demand to soften competition ...
• Waiting for my neighbors AI翻译
  作者：Gordon, Sidartha; Henry, Emeric; Murto, Pauli
  作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Aalto University; Aalto University
  摘要：We introduce a neighborhood structure in a waiting game, where the payoff of stopping increases when neighbors stop. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network can take the form of either a shrinking network, where players at the edges stop first, or a fragmenting network where interior players do. In addition to the coordination inefficiency standard in waiting games, the neighborhood structure gives rise to an additional inefficiency linked to the order in which players stop. We discu...