Selling strategic information in digital competitive markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bonnie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
• 署名单位: IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12369
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 283-313
• 关键词: price; equilibrium

摘要

This article investigates the strategies of a data broker selling information to one or to two competing firms. The data broker combines segments of the consumer demand that allow firms to third-degree price discriminate consumers. We show that the data broker (1) sells information on consumers with the highest willingness to pay; (2) keeps consumers with low willingness to pay unidentified. The data broker strategically chooses to withhold information on consumer demand to soften competition between firms. These results hold under first-degree price discrimination, which is a limit case when information is perfect.