Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Celik, Gorkem; Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland
• 署名单位: ESSEC Business School; Santa Clara University; Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12370
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 314-333
• 关键词: information; incentives; collusion

摘要

We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive conditions under which such manipulation determines the direction of distortions in public good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative, the public good is always underprovided, whereas overprovision occurs with a manipulative provider. With overprovision, not only high-valuation users, but also low-valuation users may obtain positive rents-users may prefer facing a manipulative provider.