-
作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Jeon, Doh-Shin
作者单位：Michigan State University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We investigate how platform market power affects platforms' design choices in ad-funded two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider design choices affecting both sides in opposite ways and compare private incentives with social incentives. Platforms' design biases depend crucially on whether they can charge any price on the consumer side. We apply the framework to technology adoption, ...
-
作者：Kuvalekar, Aditya; Ramos, Joao; Schneider, Johannes
作者单位：University of Essex; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：Agents, some with a bias, decide between undertaking a risky project and a safe alternative based on information about the project's efficiency. Only a part of that information is verifiable. Unbiased agents want to undertake only efficient projects, but biased agents want to undertake any project. If the project causes harm, a court examines the verifiable information, forms a belief about the agent's type, and decides the punishment. Tension arises between deterring inefficient projects and ...
-
作者：Pan, Siqi; Zhao, Xin
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We investigate the role of sellers' commitment power in discouraging consumer search. Theoretically, lack of commitment power transforms sellers' search-deterring claims into cheap talk, eliminating sellers' ability to deter search in some market environments. However, our experiments show buyers' search decisions are significantly affected by sellers' cheap talk. When future prices are not adjustable, sellers falsely claim exploding offers to deter search. When future prices are adjustable, s...
-
作者：Luo, Yao
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：I develop a multiproduct nonlinear pricing model where a firm sells both discrete and continuous services to consumers with multidimensional heterogeneity. I derive the optimal selling mechanism and provide primitive conditions under which different bundling strategies arise. Exploiting both the firm and the consumer's optimality conditions, I show that the model structure is nonparametrically identified and propose a semiparametric estimation procedure. An application to China Telecom data sh...
-
作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This article establishes a tenuous link between ability and relative well-being in teamwork. It shows that higher-ability or lower-cost members can easily fare worse than their lower-ability counterparts due to free-riding. The extent of free-riding hinges crucially on log-concavity of effort cost, which its convexity restricts little. The article further shows how to compose teams that allocate effort efficiently and equalize payoffs in equilibrium. Efficient teams must have sufficiently dive...
-
作者：Liu, Haoming; Lu, Jingfeng; Salvo, Alberto
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：We show that the prevalence of prolonged tennis contests drops sharply when the ambient environment deteriorates through heat or pollution. We develop a multi-battle dynamic model to investigate how the disutility from a protracted competition shapes agents' willingness to fight on. Our theory predicts that a poor environment amplifies the momentum of a competitor's head start. We show how model primitives including preferences for environmental amenities can be inferred from battle-to-battle ...
