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作者：Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Helsinki
摘要：We study collective choice via an endogenous agenda setting process. At each stage, a status quo is implemented unless it is replaced by a majority (winning coalition) with a new status quo outcome. The process continues until the prevailing status quo is no longer challenged. We impose a one-time deviation restriction on the feasible policy processes, reflecting the farsightedness of voters. The key feature of the solution is history dependence. The existence of the solution is proven by iter...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information aggregation in large societies. An underlying state determines payoffs from different actions. Agents decide which other agents to form a costly communication link with, incurring the associated cost. After receiving a private signal correlated with the underlying state, the agents exchange information over the induced communication network until they take an (irreversible) action....
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作者：Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Each member of a group receives a signal about the unknown state of the world and decides on a utility-maximizing recommendation on the basis of that signal. The individuals have identical preferences. The group makes a decision that maximizes the common utility function assuming perfect pooling of the information in individual signals. An action profile is a group action and a recommendation from each individual. A collection of action profiles is rational if there exists an information struc...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We develop observable restrictions of well known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the data. We show that if the disagreement point is fixed and symmetric, the Nash, utilitarian, and egalitarian max-min bargaining solutions are all observationally equivalent. Data compatible with these the...
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作者：Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; Central European University
摘要：It is widely known that loss aversion leads individuals to dislike risk and, as has been argued by many researchers, in many instances this creates an incentive for firms to shield consumers and employees against economic risks. Complementing previous research, we show that consumer loss aversion can also have the opposite effect: it can lead a firm to optimally introduce risk into an otherwise deterministic environment. We consider a profit-maximizing monopolist selling to a loss-averse consu...
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作者：Sher, Itai
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule and (ii) whose solution with additional integer constraints corresponds to the optimal static rule. We present a condition-foresight-under which the optimal persuasion problem reduces to the classical max...
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作者：Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke; Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Uenver, M. Utku
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University; Boston College
摘要：This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism that satisfies non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness, and the only mechanism that satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invar...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanie, Francois
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can simultaneously and privately trade with several buyers. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Aggregate equilibrium trades are...
