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作者：Koenig, Michael D.; Tessone, Claudio J.; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：University of Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Stockholm University
摘要：We develop a dynamic network formation model that can explain the observed nestedness in real-world networks. Links are formed on the basis of agents' centrality and have an exponentially distributed lifetime. We use stochastic stability to identify the networks to which the network formation process converges and find that they are nested split graphs. We completely determine the topological properties of the stochastically stable networks and show that they match features exhibited by real-w...
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作者：Calcagno, Riccardo; Kamada, Yuichiro; Lovo, Stefano; Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：emlyon business school; Yale University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Stanford University
摘要：We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally revised action is taken at the deadline. In two-player common interest games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In opposing interest games, which...
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作者：Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Helsinki
摘要：We study collective choice via an endogenous agenda setting process. At each stage, a status quo is implemented unless it is replaced by a majority (winning coalition) with a new status quo outcome. The process continues until the prevailing status quo is no longer challenged. We impose a one-time deviation restriction on the feasible policy processes, reflecting the farsightedness of voters. The key feature of the solution is history dependence. The existence of the solution is proven by iter...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players' payoffs depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and important class of games with multisided incomplete information. When players become sufficiently patient,...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information aggregation in large societies. An underlying state determines payoffs from different actions. Agents decide which other agents to form a costly communication link with, incurring the associated cost. After receiving a private signal correlated with the underlying state, the agents exchange information over the induced communication network until they take an (irreversible) action....
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作者：Balasko, Yves
作者单位：Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; University of York - UK
摘要：The transfer problem refers to the possibility that a donor country could end up better off after giving away some resources to another country. The simplest version of that problem can be formulated in a two consumer exchange economy with fixed total resources. The existence of a transfer problem at some equilibrium is known to be equivalent to instability in the case of two goods. This characterization is extended to an arbitrary number of goods by showing that a transfer problem exists at a...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the policies that can be implemented from any initial default in a pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multidimensional and infinite policy spaces...
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作者：Asheim, Geir B.; Zuber, Stephane
作者单位：University of Oslo; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where population size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized utilitarianism and (a version of) critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. Moreover, we establish how RDCLU avoids serious ...
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作者：Goswami, Mridu Prabal; Mitra, Manipushpak; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：In this paper, we revisit a longstanding question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz 1972). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction design, we show that in a specific quasilinear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF that satisfies non-bossiness and a mild continuity property is dictatorial. The result holds for an arbitrary number of agents, but the two-person v...
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作者：Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Each member of a group receives a signal about the unknown state of the world and decides on a utility-maximizing recommendation on the basis of that signal. The individuals have identical preferences. The group makes a decision that maximizes the common utility function assuming perfect pooling of the information in individual signals. An action profile is a group action and a recommendation from each individual. A collection of action profiles is rational if there exists an information struc...
