Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke; Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Uenver, M. Utku
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University; Boston College
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1010
• 发表日期: 2014-01-01
• 页码: 253-277
• 关键词: Random assignment; probabilistic serial; ordinal fairness; sd-efficiency; sd-envy-freeness; weak invariance; weak truncation robustness

摘要

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism that satisfies non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness, and the only mechanism that satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where sd stands for first-order stochastic dominance).