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作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We present a dynamic theory of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected number of elected representatives. The platforms include public expenditure, redistributive transfers, the tax rate, and the level of public debt. Voters cast their vote after seeing the platforms and elect representatives according to a majoritarian winner take all system. The level of debt, by affecting the budget con...
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作者：Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; New York University
摘要：We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is opposite to that in the literature on career concerns in which incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent's quality is revealed over time.
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作者：Kamihigashi, Takashi; Stachurski, John
作者单位：Kobe University; Kobe University; Australian National University
摘要：This paper extends a family of well known stability theorems for monotone economies to a significantly larger class of models. We provide a set of general conditions for existence, uniqueness, and stability of stationary distributions when monotonicity holds. The conditions in our main result are both necessary and sufficient for global stability of monotone economies that satisfy a weak mixing condition introduced in the paper. Through our analysis, we develop new insights into the nature and...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We develop observable restrictions of well known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the data. We show that if the disagreement point is fixed and symmetric, the Nash, utilitarian, and egalitarian max-min bargaining solutions are all observationally equivalent. Data compatible with these the...
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作者：Boergers, Tilman; Smith, Doug
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters' knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters' behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such assumption. However, on full domains, the only dominant strategy voting rules are random dictatorships. We show that the designer of a voting rule can achieve Pareto improvements over random dictatorship by choosing rules in which voters' behavior ...
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作者：Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures...
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作者：Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; McLean, Richard P.
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Sannikov, Yuliy
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing implementations of the algorithm from Abreu et al. (1990). These efficiency gains arise from a better understanding of the manner in which extreme points of the equilibrium payoff set are generated. An important ...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; Central European University
摘要：It is widely known that loss aversion leads individuals to dislike risk and, as has been argued by many researchers, in many instances this creates an incentive for firms to shield consumers and employees against economic risks. Complementing previous research, we show that consumer loss aversion can also have the opposite effect: it can lead a firm to optimally introduce risk into an otherwise deterministic environment. We consider a profit-maximizing monopolist selling to a loss-averse consu...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Hawkins, William B.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yeshiva University
摘要：We present a generalization of the standard random-search model of unemployment in which firms hire multiple workers and in which the hiring process is time-consuming as well as costly. We follow Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) and assume that wages are determined by continuous bargaining between the firm and its employees. The model generates a nontrivial dispersion of firm sizes; when firms' production technologies exhibit decreasing returns to labor, it also generates wage dispersion, even...
