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作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stanford University
摘要：As multi-hospital kidney exchange has grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals can choose to enroll only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already been observed. We show that as the population of hospitals and patients grows, the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully becomes low in almost every large exchange pool (although t...
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作者：Sher, Itai
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule and (ii) whose solution with additional integer constraints corresponds to the optimal static rule. We present a condition-foresight-under which the optimal persuasion problem reduces to the classical max...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
作者单位：Lund University; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget balance and nonmanipulability (Green and Laffont 1979). Our approach here is to weaken or abandon nonmanipulability. We search for the rules that are minimally manipulable among all fair and budget-balanced ru...
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作者：Demange, Gabrielle
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：Ranking methods are fundamental tools in many areas. Popular methods aggregate the statements of experts in different ways. As such, there are various reasonable ranking methods, each one of them more or less adapted to the environment under consideration. This paper introduces a new method, called the handicap-based method, and characterizes it through appealing properties. This method assigns not only scores to the items, but also weights to the experts. Scores and weights form an equilibriu...
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作者：Giraud, Raphael
作者单位：Universite Paris-VIII
摘要：This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective probabilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs, i.e., second order beliefs. A new model, called second order dual expected utility, featuring nonadditive second order beliefs, is introduced, axiomatized, and systematically contrasted with the leading alternative model of this kind, i.e., the second order subjective expected utility model (Klibanoff et al. 2005, Nau 2006, Seo 2009) for which, for the sake of comparison, ...
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作者：Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke; Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Uenver, M. Utku
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University; Boston College
摘要：This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism that satisfies non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness, and the only mechanism that satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invar...
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作者：Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Huelya
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Southampton
摘要：We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legisl...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanie, Francois
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can simultaneously and privately trade with several buyers. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Aggregate equilibrium trades are...
