-
作者：Bhargava, Mohit; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We study the consequences of positive correlation of beliefs in the design of voting rules in a model with an arbitrary number of voters. We propose a notion of positive correlation, based on the likelihood of agreement of the k-best alternatives (for any k) of two orders called top-set (TS) correlation. We characterize the set of ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC) (d'Aspremont and Peleg 1988) voting rules with TS-correlated beliefs and additionally satisfy robustness with respect to...
-
作者：Hart, Sergiu; Reny, Philip J.
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Chicago
摘要：Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer's values for the goods increase, the seller's maximal revenue may well decrease. We then identify two circumstances where monotonicity does obtain: when optimal mechanisms are deterministic and symmetric, and when they have submodular prices. Next, through simple and transparent examples, we clarify the need for and the advantage of randomiz...
-
作者：Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David; Stacchetti, Ennio
作者单位：Princeton University; New York University
摘要：A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a particular solution and appears to support some axiomatic treatments in the early literature in their conclusion that there is a negligible delay to agreement. Perturbing the model with a slightly broade...
-
作者：Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We show that the class of preferences satisfying the gross substitutes condition of [Kelso and Crawford, 1982] is strictly larger than the class of endowed assignment valuations of [Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005], thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result implies that not every substitutable valuation function can be decomposed into a combination of unit-demand valuations.
-
作者：Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.
-
作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.
-
作者：Lobel, Ilan; Sadler, Evan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a network learn about an underlying state by observing neighbors' choices. In contrast with prior work, we do not assume that the agents' sets of neighbors are mutually independent. We introduce a new metric of information diffusion in social learning that is weaker than the traditional aggregation metric. We show that if a minimal connectivity condition holds and neighborhoods are independent, inform...
-
作者：Casajus, Andre
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
摘要：Within a simple setup, we show that proportional taxation is implied by three properties: efficiency, symmetry, and monotonicity. Efficiency: redistribution has no cost. Symmetry: members of the society with the same performance obtain the same reward after redistribution. Monotonicity: whenever both the performance of a certain member of the society as well as the overall performance of the society do not decrease, then this member's reward after redistribution does not decrease.
-
作者：Nirei, Makoto
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：This study demonstrates that the interactions of firm-level indivisible investments give rise to aggregate fluctuations without aggregate exogenous shocks. When investments are indivisible, aggregate capital is determined by the number of firms that invest. I develop a method to derive the closed-form distribution of the number of investing firms when each firm's initial capital level varies stochastically. This method shows that idiosyncratic shocks may lead to nonvanishing aggregate fluctuat...
-
作者：McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：It is well known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with VCG payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to the VCG transfers that restore incentive compatibility. We ...
