-
作者：Bhargava, Mohit; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We study the consequences of positive correlation of beliefs in the design of voting rules in a model with an arbitrary number of voters. We propose a notion of positive correlation, based on the likelihood of agreement of the k-best alternatives (for any k) of two orders called top-set (TS) correlation. We characterize the set of ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC) (d'Aspremont and Peleg 1988) voting rules with TS-correlated beliefs and additionally satisfy robustness with respect to...
-
作者：Noguchi, Yuichi
摘要：In this paper, I provide a characterization of a set of probability measures with which a prior weakly merges. In this regard, I introduce the concept of conditioning rules that represent the regularities of probability measures and define the eventual generation of probability measures by a family of conditioning rules. I then show that a set of probability measures is learnable (i.e., all probability measures in the set are weakly merged by a prior) if and only if all probability measures in...
-
作者：Chandrasekher, Madhav
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper studies an infinite-horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to the principal. Observation reports, if truthful, can serve as a monitoring instrument to discipline the agents. However, reports are cheap talk so that it is also possible for agents to collude, i.e., whe...
-
作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Sandholm, William H.; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：University of Tokyo; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distribution that in super-modular games, an almost glo...
-
作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; de Marti, Joan; Prat, Andrea
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA; Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and influence flows. Second, we show that when the coordination motive dominates the adaptation motive, th...
-
作者：Hart, Sergiu; Reny, Philip J.
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Chicago
摘要：Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer's values for the goods increase, the seller's maximal revenue may well decrease. We then identify two circumstances where monotonicity does obtain: when optimal mechanisms are deterministic and symmetric, and when they have submodular prices. Next, through simple and transparent examples, we clarify the need for and the advantage of randomiz...
-
作者：Bade, Sophie
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
摘要：The study of matching problems typically assumes that agents precisely know their preferences over the goods to be assigned. Within applied contexts, this assumption stands out as particularly counterfactual. Parents typically do invest a large amount of time and resources to find the best school for their children; doctors run costly tests to establish the best kidney for a given patient. In this paper, I introduce the assumption of endogenous information acquisition into otherwise standard h...
-
作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：We study a variant of the repeated prisoner's dilemma with uncertain horizon, in which each player chooses his foresight ability; that is, the timing in which he is informed about the realized length of the interaction. In addition, each player has an independent probability to observe the opponent's foresight ability. We show that if this probability is not too close to 0 or 1, then the game admits an evolutionarily stable strategy, in which agents who look one step ahead and agents who look ...
-
作者：Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David; Stacchetti, Ennio
作者单位：Princeton University; New York University
摘要：A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a particular solution and appears to support some axiomatic treatments in the early literature in their conclusion that there is a negligible delay to agreement. Perturbing the model with a slightly broade...
-
作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram
作者单位：KU Leuven; Maastricht University; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：The transferable utility hypothesis underlies important theoretical results in household economics. We provide a revealed preference framework for bringing this (theoretically appealing) hypothesis to observational data. We establish revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied for observed household consumption behavior to be consistent with transferable utility. We also show that these conditions are testable by means of integer programming methods.
