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作者：Ulbricht, Robert
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent so as to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two information asymmetries are mutually enforcing: if one is relaxed, delegated search is efficient. With both asymmetries prevailing simultaneously, search is almost surely inefficient (it is stopped too ea...
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作者：Belhaj, Mohamed; Bervoets, Sebastian; Deroian, Frederic
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of nested split graphs. Next, we refine our results and find that, depending on the specification of the network cost function, complete networks, core-periphery networks, dominant group architectures, quasi-star networks, and quasi-complete networks can be...
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作者：Chan, Jimmy H.; Zhang, Wenzhang
作者单位：Fudan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Side-payments are common in many long-term relationships. We show that when players can exchange side-payments, approximate efficiency is achievable in any repeated game with private monitoring and communication, as long as the players can observe their own payoffs and are sufficiently patient, the efficient stage-game outcome is unique, and the signal distribution has full support. Unlike existing results in the literature, our result does not require deviations to be statistically detectable.
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作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners' payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes render the auction vulnerable to defections, as the seller can attract better offers afterward. To avoid instabilities of this type...
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作者：Weinstein, Jonathan; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs, but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage payoffs. Then cl...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.; Staudigl, Mathias
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Maastricht University
摘要：We consider a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocols, allowing the probabilities of suboptimal choices to depend on their payoff consequences. Our analysis focuses on behavior in the small noise double limit: we first take the noise level in agents' decisions to zero, and then take the population size to infinity. We show that in this double limit, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal cont...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Pereyra, Juan Sebastian
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS
摘要：We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an agent may make an early offer because she is concerned that others are making early offers. Yet other agents make early offers because they are concerned that others worry about early offers, and so on and...
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作者：Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); European University Institute; University of Palermo
摘要：We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict, and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of communism in China.
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Chernozhukov, Victor; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Under the assumption that individuals know the conditional distributions of signals given the payoff-relevant parameters, existing results conclude that as individuals observe infinitely many signals, their beliefs about the parameters will eventually merge. We first show that these results are fragile when individuals are uncertain about the signal distributions: given any such model, vanishingly small individual uncertainty about the signal distributions can lead to substantial (nonvanishing...
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作者：Burkett, Justin
作者单位：Wake Forest University
摘要：I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation mechanism). I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the principal's beliefs about the value of the item for a simple budget constraint to be the optimal contract. The results link the observed use of budget constraints to their use in models incorporating budget-constrained bidders. Other implications of the model are that a general revenue equivalence result applies an...
