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作者：Pablo Arribillaga, R.; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. W...
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作者：Fuchs, William; Ory, Aniko; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and interdependent values. Uninformed buyers compete inter- and intra-temporarily for a good sold by an informed seller suffering a liquidity shock. We contrast public versus private price offers. With two opportunities to trade, all equilibria with private offers have more trade than any equilibrium with public offers; under some additional conditions, we show Pareto dominance of the private-offers equilibria. If a fai...
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作者：Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper studies mechanism design when agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers. A first result gives a general necessary condition for a social choice rule to be implementable. The condition combines an inequality version of the standard envelope characterization of payoffs in quasilinear environments with an approach for relating agents' maxmin expected utilities to their objective expected utilities under any common prior. The condition is then applied to give an exact characterizati...
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作者：Frick, Mira
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：Motivated by the literature on choice overload, we study a boundedly rational agent whose choice behavior admits a monotone threshold representation: There is an underlying rational benchmark, corresponding to maximization of a utility function v, from which the agent's choices depart in a menu-dependent manner. The severity of the departure is quantified by a threshold map , which is monotone with respect to set inclusion. We derive an axiomatic characterization of the model, extending famili...
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作者：Abizada, Azar
作者单位：Ministry of Education of Azerbaijan Republic; ADA University
摘要：We study two-sided matching where one side (colleges) can make monetary transfers (offer stipends) to the other (students). Colleges have fixed budgets and strict preferences over sets of students. One different feature of our model is that colleges value money only to the extent that it allows them to enroll better or additional students. A student can attend at most one college and receive a stipend from it. Each student has preferences over college-stipend bundles. Conditions that are essen...
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作者：Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Ely, Jeffrey C.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Northwestern University
摘要：We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer's valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type) and a gain-loss valuation that depends on deviations of purchased quality from a reference point. Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006), we consider lossaverse buyers who evaluate gains and losses in terms of changes in the consumption valuation, but in ou...
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作者：Gomes, Renato; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Northwestern University
摘要：We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (vertical) characteristics that determine match values. Our analysis reveals how matching patterns reflect cross-subsidization between sides. Agents are endogenously partitioned into consumers and inputs. At the optimum, the costs of procuring agents-inputs are compensated by the gains from agents-consumers. We show how such cross-subsidization can be achieved through matching rules that have a si...
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作者：Kominers, Scott Duke; Sonmez, Tayfun
作者单位：Harvard University; Boston College
摘要：We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots sequentially, according to an order of precedence. We demonstrate that in these matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions typicall...
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作者：Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：In the present work, agreement on allocation of payments from multiple issues requires unanimous consent of all parties involved. The agents are assumed to know the aggregate payoffs but do not know their decomposition by issues. This framework applies to many real-world problems, such as the formation of joint ventures. We present a novel solution concept to the problem, termed the multicore, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a decomposition o...
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作者：Geromichalos, Athanasios; Herrenbrueck, Lucas; Salyer, Kevin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Simon Fraser University
摘要：A consistent empirical feature of bond yields is that term premia are, on average, positive. The majority of theoretical explanations for this observation have viewed the term premia through the lens of the consumption based capital asset pricing model. In contrast, we harken to an older empirical literature that attributes the term premium to the idea that short maturity bonds are inherently more liquid. The goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical justification of this concept. To that...
