Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, Federico; Pereyra, Juan Sebastian
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1831
• 发表日期: 2016-01-01
• 页码: 1-39
• 关键词: Stable matching; Gale-Shapley; two-sided matching; unraveling; strategic complementarities; assortative matching

摘要

We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an agent may make an early offer because she is concerned that others are making early offers. Yet other agents make early offers because they are concerned that others worry about early offers, and so on and so forth. The end result is that any given agent is more likely to make an early offer than a late