Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Weinstein, Jonathan; Yildiz, Muhamet
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1893
• 发表日期: 2016-01-01
• 页码: 157-185
• 关键词: Reputation; repeated games; COMMITMENT

摘要

In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs, but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage payoffs. Then classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs.