作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Reny, Philip J.
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Chicago
摘要：We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (males and females) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits nontransferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched co...
作者：Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study equitable allocation of indivisible goods and money among agents with other-regarding preferences. First, we argue that Foley's (1967) equity test, i.e., the requirement that no agent prefers the allocation obtained by swapping her consumption with another agent, is suitable for our environment. Then we establish the existence of allocations passing this test for a general domain of preferences that accommodates prominent other-regarding preferences. Our results are relevant for equit...
