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作者：Pereyra, Juan S.; Silva, Francisco
作者单位：Universidad de Montevideo; Deakin University
摘要：Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social planner is unable to use transfers to give incentives for agents to convey their private information. Instead, she is able to imperfectly verify their reports through signals that are positively affiliated...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study large-population repeated games where players are symmetric but not anonymous, so player-specific rewards and punishments are feasible. Players may be commitment types who always take the same action. Even though players are not anonymous, we show that an anti-folk theorem holds when the commitment action is population dominant, meaning that it secures a payoff greater than the population average payoff. For example, voluntary public goods provision in large populations is impossible ...
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作者：Mackenzie, Andrew; Trudeau, Christian
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Windsor
摘要：We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Holzman, Ron; Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Glasgow; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Glasgow
摘要：A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it?In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p. If n >= p, the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n < p, combining (varian...
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作者：Dillenberger, David; Krishna, R. Vijay; Sadowski, Philipp
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Duke University
摘要：We propose a class of dynamic models that capture subjective (and, hence, unobservable) constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can acquire, pay attention to, or absorb via an information choice process (ICP). An ICP specifies the information that can be acquired about the payoff-relevant state in the current period and how this choice affects what can be learned in the future. In spite of their generality, wherein ICPs can accommodate any dependence of the information constr...
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作者：Bernheim, B. Douglas; Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Amazon.com
摘要：How does the increasing publicness of decisions (due, e.g., to social media) affect the total costs of social signaling distortions? While pervasive signaling may induce pervasive distortions, it may also permit people to signal while distorting each choice to a smaller degree. Ironically, for a broad class of environments, a sufficient increase in the number of signaling opportunities allows senders to live authentically, that is, to signal their types at arbitrarily low overall cost. This re...
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作者：Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is, in general, more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
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作者：Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation and the seller privately observes her stochastically changing cost of delivering the good. Prices fall gradually at the early stages of negotiations, and trade is inefficiently delayed. The first-best is implementable via a mechanism, whereas all equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game are inefficient.
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作者：Teeple, Keisuke
作者单位：University of Waterloo
摘要：I model an incomplete markets economy where unaware agents do not perceive all states of nature, so unintended default can occur when asset returns differ from what was perceived. The presence of default plays a crucial role in the proof of existence-particularly in economies where beliefs are biased-by removing perceived arbitrage opportunities with respect to delivery-adjusted asset returns. The First Fundamental Welfare Theorem fails because of default and pecuniary inefficiencies, but the ...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Chatterjee, Kalyan; Dutta, Bhaskar
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Warwick; Ashoka University
摘要：This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker-a comparative statics effect that is reminiscent of Brae...
