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作者：Foster, Dean P.; Hart, Sergiu
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Amazon.com; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：To identify expertise, forecasters should not be tested by their calibration score, which can always be made arbitrarily small, but rather by their Brier score. The Brier score is the sum of the calibration score and the refinement score; the latter measures how good the sorting into bins with the same forecast is, and thus attests to expertise. This raises the question of whether one can gain calibration without losing expertise, which we refer to as calibeating. We provide an easy way to cal...
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作者：Kikuchi, Kazuya; Koriyama, Yukio
作者单位：Tokyo University of Foreign Studies; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We consider collective decision-making when society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a techniq...
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作者：Arnold, Lutz G. G.
作者单位：University of Regensburg
摘要：This paper investigates the conditions under which socially responsible investment (SRI) is neutral from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. Three conditions are jointly sufficient for neutrality of SRI. First, the financial market is complete and SRI does not compromise the spanning opportunities it provides. Second, consumers' rankings of consumption bundles are unaffected by their asset holdings. Third, firms maximize shareholder value. Under an additional assumption that is satisf...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Lanzani, Giacomo; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
摘要：We show that Bayesian posteriors concentrate on the outcome distributions that approximately minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the empirical distribution, uniformly over sample paths, even when the prior does not have full support. This generalizes Diaconis and Freedman's (1990) uniform convergence result to, e.g., priors that have finite support, are constrained by independence assumptions, or have a parametric form that cannot match some probability distributions. The concentrati...
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作者：Schulz, Karl; Tsyvinski, Aleh; Werquin, Nicolas
作者单位：University of St Gallen; Yale University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：Economic disruptions generally create winners and losers. The compensation problem consists of designing a reform of the existing income tax system that offsets the welfare losses of the latter by redistributing the gains of the former. We derive a formula for the compensating tax reform and its impact on the government budget when only distortionary tax instruments are available and wages are determined endogenously in general equilibrium. We apply this result to the compensation of robotizat...
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作者：Rosato, Antonio
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：I analyze sequential auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders who have independent private values and unit demand. Equilibrium bids are history dependent and subject to a discouragement effect: the higher is the winning bid in the current round, the less aggressive are the bids of the remaining bidders in the next round. Moreover, because they experience a loss in each round in which they fail to obtain an object, bidders are willing to pay a premium to win sooner rather than later...
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作者：Schottmueller, Christoph
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：With the goal of maximizing expected gains from trade, this paper analyzes the jointly optimal information structure and mechanism in a bilateral trade setting. The difference in gains from trade between the optimal information structure and first best constitutes the minimal loss due to asymmetric information. With binary underlying types it is shown that more than 95% of first best can be achieved while the optimal mechanism without information design may achieve less than 90% of first best....
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作者：Liu, Ce
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment and characterize the firms' payoffs. Firms fall into one of two categories: some firms must obtain the same payoff as they would in static...
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作者：Makris, Miltiadis; Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Essex; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Adelaide
摘要：This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.
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作者：Flynn, Joel P. P.; Schmidt, Lawrence D. W.; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We study a general class of consumption-savings problems with recursive preferences. We characterize the sign of the consumption response to arbitrary shocks in terms of the product of two sufficient statistics: the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) between contemporaneous consumption and continuation utility, and the relative elasticity of the marginal value of wealth (REMV). Under homotheticity, the REMV always equals 1, so the propensity of the agent to save or dis-save is alwa...
