Attack and interception in networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bloch, Francis; Chatterjee, Kalyan; Dutta, Bhaskar
• 署名单位: heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Warwick; Ashoka University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5122
• 发表日期: 2023-11-01
• 页码: 1511-1546
• 关键词: Network interdiction; networks; attack and defense; inspection games; C72; D85; K42

摘要

This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker-a comparative statics effect that is reminiscent of Braess's paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibrium of a variant of the model: one where all nodes cooperate in interception.