On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mackenzie, Andrew; Trudeau, Christian
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; University of Windsor
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4289A
• 发表日期: 2023-07-01
• 页码: 1181-1223
• 关键词: Costly inclusion; Groves mechanism; pivot mechanism; Vickrey auction; free-rider problem; labor markets; D24; D44; D47; D61; D63; D82; H41

摘要

We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments.