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作者：Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Nesterov, Alexander
作者单位：University of Lausanne; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms to select the best among them. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a new light on practical design decisions such as the design of the entry-level medical labor market in the United States, and s...
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作者：Candogan, Ozan; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：University of Chicago; Yale University
摘要：We study information design with multiple privately informed agents who interact in a game. Each agent's utility is linear in a real-valued state. We show that there always exists an optimal mechanism that is laminar partitional and bound its complexity. For each type profile, such a mechanism partitions the state space and recommends the same action profile within a partition element. Furthermore, the convex hulls of any two partition elements are such that either one contains the other or th...
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作者：Beissner, Patrick; Werner, Jan
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：The analysis of optimal risk sharing has been thus far largely restricted to nonexpected utility models with concave utility functions, where concavity is an expression of ambiguity aversion and/or risk aversion. This paper extends the analysis to a-maxmin expected utility, Choquet expected utility, and cumulative prospect theory, which accommodate ambiguity seeking and risk seeking attitudes. We introduce a novel methodology of quasidifferential calculus of Demyanov and Rubinov (1986, 1992) a...
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作者：Iaryczower, Matias; Oliveros, Santiago
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Bristol
摘要：We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics, including lobbying, exclusive deals, and acquisition of complementary patents. In this context, we study how the allocation of bargaining power between principal and agents affects efficiency and welfare. We show that when the principal's willingness to pay is large relative to agents' payoffs for completi...
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作者：Allman, Maxwell; Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Southern California
摘要：Lotteries are a common way to resolve ties in assignment mechanisms that ration resources. We consider a model with a continuum of agents and a finite set of resources with heterogeneous qualities, where the agents' preferences are generated from a multinomial-logit (MNL) model based on the resource qualities. We show that all agents prefer a common lottery to independent lotteries at each resource if every resource is popular, meaning that the mass of agents ranking that resource as their fir...
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作者：Sadakane, Hitoshi
作者单位：Kyoto University
摘要：We analyze a cheap-talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in a finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, the sender sends a message in each period, and the receiver then voluntarily pays money for the message. As in the canonical cheap-talk model, all the equilibria are interval partitional; in our setting, however, the set of equilibrium partitions becomes larger. We show that the multistage information...
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作者：Kirpalani, Rishabh; Madsen, Erik
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; New York University
摘要：We study the interaction of incentives to free-ride on information acquisition and strategically delay irreversible investment in environments in which multiple firms evaluate an investment opportunity. In our model, two firms decide how quickly to privately obtain information about the profitability of a project and when (if ever) to publicly invest in it. Multiple equilibria exist, differing with respect to how much information firms acquire as well as how quickly they invest. The equilibriu...
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作者：Miyagishima, Kaname
作者单位：Aoyama Gakuin University
摘要：In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that even if all agents share the same preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and equity requiring society to reduce inequality regardless of the past. We argue that responsibility for past choices should be taken into account and, thus, the equity axiom is not compelling. Then we in...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Fan; Hsu, Wen-Tai; Peng, Shin-Kun
作者单位：National University Kaohsiung; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：Power laws in productivity and firm size are well documented empirical regularities. As they are upper right-tail phenomena, this paper shows that assuming asymptotic power functions for various model primitives (such as demand and firm heterogeneity) are sufficient for matching these regularities. This greatly relaxes the functional-form restrictions in economic modeling and can be beneficial in certain contexts. We demonstrate this in a modified Melitz (2003) model, which embeds an innovatio...
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel; Bolte, Lukas
作者单位：University of Toronto; Stanford University
摘要：We study contracting when both principal and agent have to exert noncontractible effort for production to take place. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees to each party in spite of the surrounding uncertainty. Both parties are risk-neutral; there is no limited liability. Linear contracts, which leave the agent with a constant share of output in exchange for a fixed fee, are optimal. This result holds both in a p...
