Pervasive signaling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernheim, B. Douglas; Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Amazon.com
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4641
• 发表日期: 2023-01-01
• 页码: 163-196
• 关键词: Multidimensional signaling; efficient information transmission; online social networks; D82

摘要

How does the increasing publicness of decisions (due, e.g., to social media) affect the total costs of social signaling distortions? While pervasive signaling may induce pervasive distortions, it may also permit people to signal while distorting each choice to a smaller degree. Ironically, for a broad class of environments, a sufficient increase in the number of signaling opportunities allows senders to live authentically, that is, to signal their types at arbitrarily low overall cost. This result survives when social networking technologies expand signaling opportunities and audience size in tandem, provided the returns to the latter are not too great.