All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
• 署名单位: Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5111
• 发表日期: 2023-07-01
• 页码: 1023-1061
• 关键词: Obvious strategy-proofness; sequential allotment rules; division problems; single-peaked preferences; D71

摘要

For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is, in general, more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.