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作者：Deng, Shanglyu; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan
作者单位：University of Macau; National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier opponents, but not those of their contemporaneous or future rivals. We establish the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and fully characterize the equilibrium. Ba...
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作者：Louis-Sidois, Charles; Musolff, Leon
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We analyze a vote-buying model where the members of a committee vote on a proposal important to a vote buyer. Each member incurs a privately-drawn disutility if the proposal passes. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal passes in all equilibria. When members vote simultaneously, the number of bribes is at least 50% larger than the number of votes required to pass the proposal (vote threshold). The number of bribes increases with the dispersion of the d...
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作者：Ekici, Ozgun
作者单位：Ozyegin University
摘要：We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair efficiency. A rule is pair-efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair-efficient rules, ...
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作者：Huang, Xuesong
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University
摘要：I study whether self-fulfilling bank runs can occur when banks use sophisticated contracts and withdrawal decisions are public information. In a finite-agent version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with correlated types, I first present an example in which a bank run perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists. However, its existence relies on off-path beliefs that are unreasonable in terms of forward induction. To discipline beliefs, I use forward induction equilibrium (Cho (1987)) as the solution conce...
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作者：Barthelemy, Jean; Mengus, Eric
作者单位：European Central Bank; Bank of France; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self-fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static macroeconomic games, the government can obtain a unique equilibrium with any low level of commitment ability. We finally derive implications for models of bailouts and capital taxation.
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作者：Bhaskar, V.; Olszewski, Wojciech; Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Northwestern University
摘要：We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Our focus is on equilibria that are robust to the addition of small privately observed shocks to the payoffs. Existing constructions of positive-effort equilibria are not robust to such payoff shocks. Allowing for simultaneous cheap-talk announcements makes some effort sustainable in a robust equilibrium, and payoffs can be arbitrarily close to fully e...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Turansick, Christopher
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland Baltimore
摘要：We study random joint choice rules, allowing for interdependence of choice across agents. These capture random choice by multiple agents, or a single agent across goods or time periods. Our interest is in separable choice rules, where each agent can be thought of as acting independently of the other. A random joint choice rule satisfies marginality if for every individual choice set, we can determine the individual's choice probabilities over alternatives independently of the other individual'...
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作者：Gretschko, Vitali; Mass, Helene
作者单位：University of Munster; University of Bonn
摘要：The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of their competitors' valuations, but only the mean of the distribution. We propose a novel equilibrium solution concept based on worst-case reasoning. We find an essentially unique and efficient worst-case equilibrium of the first-price auction that has appealing properties from both the bidders' a...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We introduce a model of large many-to-one matching markets with occupational choice where each individual can choose which side of the market to belong to. We show that stable matchings exist under mild assumptions; in particular, both complementarities and externalities can be accommodated. Our model generalizes Greinecker and Kah (2021), which focuses on one-to-one matching and did not allow for occupational choice. Applications include the roommate problem with nonatomic participants, expla...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo; Govindan, Srihari
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We provide a shorter proof of the main result in Reny and Perry (2006, Econometrica) by establishing a lower semicontinuity property of auctions as the number of traders goes to infinity, leveraging existence of equilibria in the limit auction. Our proof also eliminates two of the assumptions in their paper.
