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作者：Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's value is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of an infinite-horizon, mechanism-selection game. Despite being able to choose mechanisms, the seller can do no better and no worse than if he chose prices in each period, so that he is subject to Coase's conjecture. Our analysis marries insights from information a...
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作者：Zhang, Mengxi
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：I investigate the design of effort-maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible. Further, I identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the winner-takes-all prize structure to be optimal. When this condition fails, the designer may prefer to award multiple prizes of descending sizes...
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作者：Kambhampati, Ashwin
作者单位：United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; United States Naval Academy
摘要：A principal provides incentives for independent agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown that an anti-informativeness principle holds: very generally, robustly optimal contracts must link the incentive pay of the agents. In symmetric and binary environments, they must exhibit joint performance evaluation-each agent's pay is increasing in the performance of the other.
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作者：Betto, Maria; Thomas, Matthew W.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments, marketing, and R&D races. To understand this influence, we study a general class of asymmetric, two-player all-pay auctions where we allow for spillovers in each player's reward. The link between participan...
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作者：Kang, Kee-Youn
作者单位：Yonsei University
摘要：We develop a monetary model in which a private company issues digital currency and uses payment data to estimate consumers' preferences. Sellers purchase preference information to produce goods that better match consumers' preferences. A monopoly arises in the digital currency industry, and digital currency is not issued if the inflation rate is sufficiently high. Due to reinforcing interactions between the value of preference information and trade volume, multiple equilibria (with and without...
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作者：Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix
作者单位：University of Bonn; Technical University of Munich
摘要：We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability, (ii) if a strategy profile is played in two games, it is also played in every convex combination of these games, and (iii) players can shift probability arbitrarily between two indistinguishable actions, and deleting one of these actions has no effect. Our th...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Ishii, Yuhta
作者单位：Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We build a model studying the effect of an economy's potential for social learning on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Assuming consumers are forward-looking (i.e., recognize the value of waiting for information), we analyze how qualitative and quantitative features of the learning environment affect equilibrium adoption dynamics, welfare, and the speed of learning. Based on this, we show how differences in the learning environment translate into observable differences in adop...
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作者：Duraj, Jetlir; He, Kevin
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A Bayesian agent experiences gain-loss utility each period over changes in belief about future consumption (news utility) with diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news. Diminishing sensitivity induces a preference over news skewness: gradual bad news, one-shot good news is worse than one-shot resolution, which is in turn worse than gradual good news, one-shot bad news. So the agent's preference between gradual information and one-shot resolution can depend on his consumption ranking ...
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作者：Chen, Yiqiu; Moeller, Markus
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Bonn
摘要：Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for a public school assignment. A potential drawback of EDA is that it could encourage students to game the system since it is not strategy-proof. However, to successfully strategize, students typically need information that is unlikely to be available to them in practice. We model school choice under incomplete information and show that EDA is regret-free truth-telling, which is a weaker incentive property t...
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作者：Barilla, Cesar; Goncalves, Duarte
作者单位：Columbia University; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium, instability generated by a player decreases when the status quo favors them more. Equilibrium always exhibits a region of stable states in which the status quo persists. As players' threat power increases,...
