Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
• 署名单位: University of Surrey
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5915
• 发表日期: 2024-07-01
• 页码: 1261-1304
• 关键词: Stable matching; large markets; occupational choice; C78

摘要

We introduce a model of large many-to-one matching markets with occupational choice where each individual can choose which side of the market to belong to. We show that stable matchings exist under mild assumptions; in particular, both complementarities and externalities can be accommodated. Our model generalizes Greinecker and Kah (2021), which focuses on one-to-one matching and did not allow for occupational choice. Applications include the roommate problem with nonatomic participants, explaining the size and distribution of firms and wage inequality.