Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barthelemy, Jean; Mengus, Eric
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Bank of France; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5866
• 发表日期: 2024-07-01
• 页码: 1119-1150
• 关键词: Implementation; limited commitment; policy rules; C73; E58; E61; G28

摘要

The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self-fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static macroeconomic games, the government can obtain a unique equilibrium with any low level of commitment ability. We finally derive implications for models of bailouts and capital taxation.