Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ekici, Ozgun
• 署名单位: Ozyegin University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5471
• 发表日期: 2024-05-01
• 页码: 551-564
• 关键词: Indivisible object; pair efficient; strategy-proof; individually rational; top trading cycles; C78; D61; D63; D82

摘要

We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair efficiency. A rule is pair-efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair-efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. Our characterization result gives strong support to the use of TTC in object reallocation problems.