Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gretschko, Vitali; Mass, Helene
• 署名单位: University of Munster; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4555
• 发表日期: 2024-01-01
• 页码: 61-93
• 关键词: Auctions; worst-case equilibria; uncertainty; D44; D81; D82

摘要

The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of their competitors' valuations, but only the mean of the distribution. We propose a novel equilibrium solution concept based on worst-case reasoning. We find an essentially unique and efficient worst-case equilibrium of the first-price auction that has appealing properties from both the bidders' and the seller's point of view.