Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barelli, Paulo; Govindan, Srihari
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5486
• 发表日期: 2024-05-01
• 页码: 565-582
• 关键词: Monotone equilibrium; large auctions; rational expectations equilibrium; degree theory; C62; D44; D82

摘要

We provide a shorter proof of the main result in Reny and Perry (2006, Econometrica) by establishing a lower semicontinuity property of auctions as the number of traders goes to infinity, leveraging existence of equilibria in the limit auction. Our proof also eliminates two of the assumptions in their paper.